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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
IN CASES WHERE JURIES ARE WAIVED
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND*
RIAL by jury is a somewhat complicated process. Two judicial
agencies divide the field between them, one dealing with issues of
fact and the other with matters of law. But the two proceedings
are mutually dependent. The court is required to determine what issues
of fact are present in the case and to convey that information to the jury,
whereupon it becomes the exclusive duty of the jury to decide those
issues. The court is also required to determine what principles of law
should control the case, but it is not essential that the jury be informed
regarding them unless the jury is to apply the law to the facts. This is a
proper but not a necessary jury function, for under our traditional con-
ception of the judicial process either the jury or the court may be per-
mitted to perform it. If the application is to be made by the jury the
court must inform it as to what those principles are, while if the court is
to make the application the jury must inform the court what facts are to
be deemed established. In either event, therefore, one agency must com-
municate its conclusions to the other.
The technique which the common law developed for securing the neces-
sary co-operation between the judge and jury in this joint proceeding was
reasonably convenient and effective. The judge stated to the jury what
issues of fact there were in the case. If a special verdict was to be ren-
dered he did this by submitting written questions to be answered in writ-
ing by the jury, or by submitting alternative statements of facts, one or
the other of which was to be selected and approved by the jury in ac-
cordance with its view of the evidence. To the facts so established by the
special verdict the judge then applied the law by rendering such a judg-
ment as the law and the facts required.
If the verdict was to be general, the judge orally stated to the jury what
principles of law it should apply to the facts which it might find. The jury
thereupon made the application by rendering a verdict for one party or
the other, as the law and the facts required, without, however, expressly
stating what those facts were. The court then rendered judgment in
accordance with this verdict.
* Professor of Law and Legal Research, University of Michigan.
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This formal and somewhat elaborate procedure was entirely due to the
simultaneous use of two different agencies for dealing with the contro-
versy. If one agency alone, either the jury as in the early days of the com-
mon law, or the judge as in the chancery courts, had been authorized to
deal with the whole case, these methods for the communication of informa-
tion between judge and jury would no longer serve any useful purpose in
the trial of the case.
When, accordingly, waiver of juries in law actions was authorized,
there was no necessity, from the point of view of trial convenience, for
retaining any counterpart of the mechanism by which court and jury com-
municated with each other. By combining both functions in the judge
he could proceed directly to decide the case, without, as judge, expressly
informing himself, as jury, what legal principles should be employed in
reaching a general decision, or as jury, expressly informing himself, as
judge, what facts had been found.
I. LEGISLATION REGARDING FINDINGS
England and the British dominions, in adminstering non-jury cases at
law, completely abandoned all those features of the common law trial
which were based upon the division of functions between judge and jury.
The English rule simply provides that "The judge shall, at or after the
trial, direct judgment to be entered as he shall think right."' No formal
statements are required from the judge as to the issues which he considers
material or as to the principles of law which he considers controlling. He
is not required, in his capacity as jury to formally make findings of fact,
either general or special, to which, in his capacity as judge, he applies the
law which he has announced. He merely proceeds, in the informal man-
ner of a chancery judge, to hear the case and decide it. Mr. Odgers de-
scribes the whole process in a single sentence: "In non-jury cases he [the
judge] gives judgment at the conclusion of counsels' speeches, stating his
reasons.112 Even the reasons are not required, and some of the approved
forms do not contain them.3 Nothing need be stated by the judge beyond
sufficient facts and directions to enable the clerks in the proper depart-
ment to enter the correct judgment. 4
This simple method of conducting non-jury trials is followed in a few
%Order 36, rule 39. Similar provisions are found in the dominions: Ontario Jud. Act, rule
55 (1915); Australia, Order 33, rule 22; Queensland, 3 Pub. Gen. Acts 319I, Rules of Court,
Order 39, rule 37.
2 Odgers, Pleading and Practice, § 339 (xxth ed.).
3 Chitty's Forms 445 (1931); See Ontario Jud. Act i9iS, Rule 264, n.p. 723.
4 England, Order 36, rule 41; Order 41, rule 2; Australia, Order 33, rule 23.
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American states. In three of the New England states: Maine,- Massa-
chusetts, 6 and Vermont;7 two central Atlantic states: Virginia, 8 and West
Virginia; 9 and three southern states: Florida, ° Louisiana," and Missis-
sippi," no special rules or regulations seem to be prescribed for the con-
duct of non-jury trials. The judges are merely authorized to hear and
determine such cases, or the authority to do so is inferred from the exist-
ence of the right to waive a jury. In Michigan by court rule adopted in
1931,13 and in Illinois by statute enacted in I933,14 the characteristic
analogues of the jury trial, namely the separate findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, have been declared to be unnecessary for any purpose,
and in a number of other states, statutes formerly requiring them have
been repealed.Ys
But in the great majority of the jurisdictions in this country trials
without a jury have been complicated by more or less elaborate require-
ments for retaining the counterparts of the procedure at common law
developed in jury cases.
It was the evident purpose of the New York Practice Commission of
1848 to provide a trial procedure in non-jury cases free from every ves-
tige of the common law jury technique. The model before them was the
trial in equity. In their first report the Commission discussed the question
whether law and equity cases could be tried by a uniform method, and
concluded without hesitation that a trial by the court was equally applica-
ble to both. The equity requirement of written testimony, it was pointed
out, was a wholly unnecessary and immaterial feature, which could with
great advantage be eliminated. So modified, the equity method of trying
issues of fact was entirely suitable for jury-waived cases at law.'6
This theory was embodied in section 267 of the Code of 1849, which
provided, without further elaboration, that "Upon a trial of a question
of fact by the court its decision shall be given in writing, and filed with the
clerk ..... Judgment upon the decision shall be entered accordingly."
5 Me. Rev. Stat. 1930, C. 9I, § 26.
6 Mass. Ann. L., 1933, C. 231, § 77.
7 Vt. Pub. L., 1933, § 2069.
8 Va. Code 1930, § 6012; see also Bagby's Md. Code 1924, art. 75, §§ 109, 133.
9 W.Va. Off. Code 1931, C. 56, art. 6, § ii. n Dart's La. Prac. Code, § 494 (I932).
10 Fla. Comp. Gen. L. 1927, § 4358. - Miss. Code 193o, §§ 577, 58o, 587.
13 Mich. Ct. Rules, rule 37 (1931 and 1933).
'4 Civ. Prac. Act 1933, § 64.
Is Some of these statutes are hereinafter referred to.
16 Field, Speeches, Arguments and Miscellaneous Papers 270.
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The foregoing provision, which is substantially identical with the mod-
ern English rule in non-jury cases, if examined by a mind strongly im-
pressed with the common law pattern and determined to retain every-
thing reminiscent of the old procedure not expressly abolished, could per-
haps be interpreted as not excluding the use of conclusions of law and
findings of fact as substitutes for the court's instructions and the jury's
verdict. In an early case Hand, J., observed that the statute was "very
obscure in relation to trial by the court," and "unless the decision finds
all the facts distinctly traversed .... it will be very difficult for the
parties to know and protect their rights in any future suit, and the record
must necessarily be imperfect ..... " and he concluded that, by analogy
to the former practice, special findings should be made on all the issues.' 7
The reason here given is not convincing, for the common law general
verdict, which was the form of verdict ordinarily used, never disclosed
the particular facts found and yet it had caused no practical difficulty
when it became necessary to establish a prior recovery. The real objec-
tion to the simplified practice was perhaps an unconscious professional
hostility to a departure from familiar forms. But whatever the explana-
tion, it was not long until an amendment of section 267 found its way into
the statutes which largely nullified the purpose of the Field Commission.
By this act, passed in 186o, it was provided that the decision "shall
contain a statement of the facts found, and the conclusions of law sepa-
rately," and that "judgment upon the decision shall be entered accord-
ingly."
This statute was the forerunner of a vast amount of legislation which,
in a majority of the states of this country, imposed upon non-jury trials
many of the technical features incident to trials by jury at common law.
The extraordinary amount of variation among American statutes deal-
ing with written findings and conclusions is persuasive evidence of a want
of any sound theory of procedural policy upon which they might be sup-
posed to rest. Some require findings of fact but not conclusions of law,
while others require both. Some make one or both obligatory in all cases,
some require them only when specially requested, and some require them
unless they are waived. Some statutes permit either general or special
findings, others require all findings to be special, others permit general
findings unless one of the parties requests that they be special, or unless
one of the parties shall make such request "with a view to excepting to
the decision of the court," and others are silent as to their form. Under
most statutes findings are equally necessary in law and equity cases, but
17 Gilchrist v. Stevenson, 7 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 273 (1852).
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some statutes apply only to actions at law. Some make the finding a part
of the record, others are silent on the point."8
This want of a settled and uniform practice among the several states
finds a parallel in the want of continuity in the statutory policy of many
of the individual states. Thus, New York required no findings in its
Code of 1848, but in 186o separate findings of law and fact were made
obligatory. In 1895 it was provided that the decision "may state sepa-
rately the facts found and the conclusions of law."' 9 In 19o3 obligatory
special findings were restored;2 in 1934 a general finding was made per-
missive unless the parties stipulated for special findings;2 and in 1936
special findings were required but might be either oral or written.22
In California findings were required in every case, under the law o.f
i85i ;23 in i866 they were required only if requested by either party;2 4 and
in i87 2 they were required in all cases unless expressly waived.25
In Colorado it was provided by the Code of 1877 that findings should
be made in all cases if required by either party, 6 but this provision is not
found in the Code of 1887. Nevada required separate findings of law and
fact in 1861 27 but this was repealed in 1915.8 In New Jersey prior to 1912
there was no requirement for findings, aside from a general provision that
the report or determination of the court should be entered in the min-
utes, 9 but in the Practice Act of 1912 findings were required.30 Missis-
is The statutes now requiring findings of some kind under some of the conditions here men-
tioned are the following: Ala. Code 1928, § 95oo; Ariz. Rev. Code T928, § 3819; Ark. Civ.
Code x934, § 364; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. i93I, §§ 632-34; Conn. Gen. Stat. i93o, § 566o; Idaho
Code 1932, §§ 7-302, 7-304; Burns Ind. Stats. 1933, §§ 2-2101, 2-2102; Iowa Code 1931,
§ II435; Kan. Rev. Stats. 1923, § 60-2921; Mo. Rev. Stats. 1929, § 952; Mason's Minn. Stats.
1927, § 9311; Mont. Rev. Code 1921, §§ 9366-8; Neb. Comp. Stats. 1929, § 20-1127; Nev.
Comp. L. 1929, § 8783; N.J. Prac. Act 1912, rules 74, 75; N.Y.L. 1936, c. 915; N.C. Code '931,
§ 569; N.D. Comp. L. 1913, §§ 7638-4o; Throckmorton's Ohio Code 1934, § 11421-22; Okla.
Stats. 1931, § 374; Ore. Code x930, § 2-5o2; Purdon's Pa. Stats. 1931, tit. 12, § 689; R.I. Gen.
L. 1923, § 4911; S.C. Code 1932, § 649; S.D. Comp. L. 1929, §§ 2525-27; Shannon's Tenn.
Code 1932, § 881; Tex. Comp. Stats. 1928, §§ 22o8, 2209; Utah Rev. Stats. 1933, §§ I04-26-2,
3; Remington's Wash. Rev. Stats. 1932, §§ 367, 368; Wis. Stats. 1933, § 270.33; Wyo. Rev.
Stats. x93x, §§ 89-I32X; 28 U.S.C.A. § 773 (1934).
19 Parson's Code 1899, § 1022 (italics added).
20 Parker's Code i9o4, § 1022.
2 Cahill's N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, § 44oa (1934).
-Id. at § 44o, as amended by Laws of 1936, c. 915.
23 Laws, i851, second session, pp. 78-79. 27 Sec. i8o.
24 Laws i865-6, p. 844. 28 Comp. L. 1929, § 8783, note.
2s Code of 1872, § 632. 19 Comp. L. 1910, P. 4100, § 154.
26 Code, § i85. 30 Rule 74.-
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sippi had a provision for findings of fact and law in its Code of 1871, but
the revised code of i88o omitted it.3"
An examination of the questions which have arisen out of these various
provisions for findings will show how troublesome they have been and how
little they have contributed toward an efficient administration of justice
in the trial courts.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
These correspond to the instructions given by the court to a jury when
it renders a general verdict and to the rules which the court applies when
it renders judgment upon a special verdict. Most states which require
findings of fact also require findings or conclusions of law, though Alabama
and Connecticut do not. On the other hand, Maryland requires only
conclusions of law.
32
Requirements for stating both conclusions of law and findings of fact
carry the analogy of the jury technique beyond what the common law
itself ever contemplated. It was only when the jury rendered a general
verdict that formal propositions of law were stated by the court in giving
or refusing instructions. When a special verdict was rendered the court
was never required to formally spread upon the record the conclusions of
law which it chose to apply in rendering judgment upon that verdict.
But in spite of the great extension and mandatory terms of the require-
ment for conclusions of law, it has become practically a dead letter. To
reverse a correct judgment because no conclusions of law were stated or
because the court stated wrong conclusions, would be absurd. As the
Supreme Court of California said in Haffley v. Maier:
The judgment was right on the undisputed facts, though a wrong reason was given
for it. But we do not reverse for what we regard as bad logic, but for what we consider
bad law."
If it should be held that the court committed error in stating incorrect
conclusions of law, yet after a correct judgment has been rendered such
error would be without prejudice and ought to be given no consideration.
Thus, in Nelson v. Ferris, the court said:
As the only error set up in the record is the judge's conclusion of law from the facts
found, we are only required to consider whether the facts found support the judgment.
If they do so, it is not very important to inquire whether the conclusions of law apart
from the judgment are correct or not. Unless the plaintiff has been injured by the
judgment it will not be disturbed.34
3' Code of 1871, § 65o; compare Code of i88o.
32Md. Ann. Code 1924, art. 75, § 1O9.
33 13 Cal. 14, IS (x859). 343 o Mich. 497, 498 (1874).
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In Gathemann v. City of Chicago,3S error was assigned on the ground that
the propositions of law stated by the trial court were inconsistent but the
court said that, conceding such inconsistency, there should be no reversal
because the right judgment had been rendered on the established facts.
In Rea v. Haffenden,36 no conclusions of law whatever were stated but the
court refused to reverse, on the ground that the judgment was sustained
by the facts and failure to state express conclusions of law was therefore
immaterial. So in Gaffney v. Megrath,37 the court held that it was its
duty, irrespective of the correctness or even of the existence of conclusions
of law, to direct such a judgment as the facts warranted.
The formulation and presentation to the court of legal propositions
might often be useful for challenging the court's attention to the legal
questions involved in the case. But this is a matter of mere trial con-
venience. If no formal conclusions are employed counsel could bring out
the same points in other ways during the trial and argument of the case.
Formal legal conclusions and oral suggestions would serve exactly the
same purpose in securing a proper judgment, and counsel might well be
permitted to make their own choice between the two methods. By
attempting to turn a matter of occasional convenience into an inflexible
and obligatory requirement of practice, the statutes have complicated,
without facilitating, the task of court and counsel in trying non-jury
cases, and have multiplied the opportunities for vexatious appeals.
III. GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT
The federal statute permits the judge in his discretion to make either
a general or a special finding of facts. The statutes of Alabama, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and
Wyoming, expressly permit a general finding unless one of the parties
requests special findings. In New Jersey the finding may be general when
all the facts are found for the prevailing party.
A general finding is a very simple thing to draw, and introduces no
difficulty into the conduct of the trial. But it is as useless-as it is simple.
A judgment for a party necessarily implies a general finding for that
party, and to require a formal general finding in addition to the judgment
is quite superfluous. This is apparent from the ease with which the courts
are able to supply its place by presumption.
In a number of states the statutes expressly provide that findings may
be waived by the parties in the manner therein specified. This is the case
3 263 Ill. 292, IO4 N.E. io85 (1914).
36 1I6 Cal. 596, 48 Pac. 716 (1897). 37 1I Wash. 456, 39 Pac. 973 (1895).
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in California, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota. A
judgment could be sustained under such a waiver only on the theory of
an implied general finding for the party for whom the judgment was
rendered, and it has been held that in such a case a general finding in
support of the judgment will be conclusively presumed. 38 But the court
will go farther still to avoid disturbing a judgment because of an absence
of any finding. Where no waiver has in fact taken place, the court will
nevertheless presume a waiver, in the absence of an affirmative showing
to the contrary in the record, in order to indulge the further presumption
of a general finding in favor of the judgment.
In some states no findings are required unless requested by one of the
parties. This is the rule in Arizona, Connecticut, Iowa, Nevada, Rhode
Island, Tennessee and Texas. If no request is made, and there are no
findings, it has been held that the judgment will be sustained by implying
a general finding.40
It would appear, therefore, that general findings of fact like conclusions
of law, are purely formal requirements, which serve no substantially use-
ful purpose and ought always to follow as a necessary inference from the
judgment itself, but they cause little or no trouble because they are easy
to draw and can be supplied by intendment whenever the point is raised.
However, they introduce a source of risk into the proceedings by pre-
senting a basis for a possible technical objection to the judgment.
IV. SPECIAL FINDINGS OF FACT
There is no express authorization of general findings in the statutes of
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota,
Montana, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington or
Wisconsin, and it is generally assumed, from the wording employed, that
the findings are required to be special. Rhode Island expressly requires
special findings.
By comparing this list with the list of states previously given in which
either kind of finding is permitted, it appears that in about two-thirds of
those jurisdictions which recognize the practice, special findings are re-
3S Rankin v. Newman, 107 Cal. 602, 6o8, 40 Pac. 1024, 1025, 41 Pac. 304 (I895).
39 Campbell v. Coburn, 77 Cal. 36, 18 Pac. 86o (x888); Squier v. Lowenberg, x Idaho
78s (188o).
40 Murray v. Osborne, 33 Nev. 267, 277, i1 Pac. 31, 33 (1910); Craig v. Marx, 65 Tex.
649 (i886); Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. United Eastern Min. Co., 24 Ariz. 269, 209 Pac. 283
(1922).
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quired in all cases, while in about one-third of them special findings may
be required where the parties or the court so elect.
The actively troublesome character of the special finding results largely
from two features: (i) it is usually deemed to be a part of the record or
judgment roll; and (2) it is held to serve the same purpose, and to be
judged by the same standards, as a special verdict. The statutes of Iowa
and Washington expressly provide that the finding shall have the effect
of a special verdict, but the others are nevertheless construed to intend
the same thing without express language to that effect.
There is nothing more technical than a special verdict. It must be
sufficient on its face to sustain the judgment, and every fact not stated is
deemed to have been found against the party having the burden of proof.
An inadvertent omission is as fatal as an actual defect in the case. Even
facts not contested at the trial, if formally in issue on the pleadings, must
be included, or the party relying upon them will be unable to sustain a
judgment.4' Such facts, being outside the actual issues of the trial, are
easily overlooked. The facts stated must be only ultimate facts, not evi-
dence or legal conclusions, and as no safe test has ever been devised by
which to distinguish between these three kinds of statements, the task
of drawing up the verdict is obviously a difficult one. And finally, the
facts must be stated in definite, certain and unambiguous terms. The
problems involved in framing the special verdict are analogous to those
involved in drawing pleadings, and both documents are subject to similar
objections. But while the pleadings are subject to attack at a time when
defects may still be removed by amendment, a defective special verdict
is incurable after the jury is discharged, and the rights of the parties are
fixed by it without regard to the actual circumstances of the case. In other
words, parties employ special verdicts strictly at their peril. For that
reason the special verdict has largely gone out of use. Holdsworth says
that the practice of taking a general verdict subject to a special case was
due to the difficulty of framing special verdicts,42 and common law writers
recommended that practice. 43
If the special finding is to be a part of the judgment roll, the common
law requirements regarding the record at once apply, and nothing beyond
the facts set out in the findings can be looked to to support the judgment.
4r Standard Sewing Machine Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 20X Pa. St. 645, 5i Ati. 354 (1902);
Hodges v. Easton, xo6 U.S. 408 (1882).
42 i Holdsworth, History of English Law 282-83 (1931).
43 1 Archbold, Practice 216; 2 BI. Comm. *378; i Burrell, Supreme Court Practice 242;
Wyche, Treatise on Practice 169.
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Numerous decisions hold that the findings are to be considered the sole
foundation upon which the judgment rests. 44
This means that after a party has assumed and surmounted the risk
of stating his case in the form of technically good pleadings, he must again
incur the risk of translating his proofs into the form of technically good
special findings.
All the technical refinements of the special verdict reappear in the
special findings, and there are decisions which sustain, as against such a
finding, every type of objection which could have been made to a special
verdict. Thus, the omission from the finding of any fact in issue is equiva-
lent to a finding that it was not proved, 4 or will at least prevent the entry
of a judgment for the party who relies upon it. 4 6 The facts found must be
sufficient to support the judgment, as nothing will be taken by intend-
ment.47 A judgment cannot rest upon legal conclusions, 48 nor upon evi-
dentiary facts,49 nor upon inconsistent findings,50 nor upon findings which
are uncertain or ambiguous,"' nor upon facts not responsive to the plead-
ings.52 Nor can insufficient special findings be aided by adding a general
finding.5 3
Rules of liberal construction, presumptions in favor of the judgment,
remand for new trial as a substitute for the injustice of a final judgment
on defective findings, or a remand for additional or amended findings as a
substitute for an unnecessary new trial, and other doctrines and devices,
have been resorted to in mitigation of the harshness of the common law
practice relating to special verdicts. But the burden of preparing find-
ings, and many opportunities for attack upon the judgment, still remain
in every case where findings are used. In recommending the abolition of
44 Western Dry Goods Co. v. Hamilton, 86 Wash. 478, 15o Pac. 1171 (1915); O'Blinski v.
Kent Circuit judge, 3 4 Mich. 62 (1876); Miller v. Barnett, 49 Okla. 5o8, i53 Pac. 641 (1915).
45 Graham v. State ex rd. Comm'rs, 66 Ind. 386, 394 (1879); James v. West, 67 Ohio St. 28,
49, 65 N.E. I56, 16o (1902).
46 Speegle v. Leese, 51 Cal. 415 (1876).
47 Hill v. Swihart, 148 Ind. 319, 323, 47 N.E. 705, 706 (1897); St. Paul & Duluth R.R. Co.
v. Village of Hinckley, 53 Minn. 398, 55 N.W. 56o (1893).
48 Utah Nat. Bank v. Nelson, 38 Utah 169, iii Pac. 907 (i9io); Kane v. Rippey, 22 Ore.
299, 29 Pac. ioo5 (1892).
49 Pio Pico v. Cuyas, 47 Cal. 174 (1873).
so Randall v. Hunter, 66 Cal. 512, 6 Pac. 331 (1885); Kountz v. Kountz, is S.D. 66; 87
N.W. 523 (i9oi).
s Buchanan v. Milligan, io8 Ind. 433, 9 N.E. 385 (i886); Lesher v. Getman, 28 Minn. 93,
9 N.W. 585 (i88i).
S2 Florence Mfg. Co. v. Pacific Exp. Co., 36 Utah 346; 1o3 Pac. 966 (19o9).
S3 Savings & Loan Society v. Burnett, io6 Cal. 514, 539, 39 Pac. 922, 929 (1895).
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special findings in jury-waived cases the Michigan Procedure Commission
said:
It is an opinion widely held by the bar and bench of this state, that the greatest
obstacle to the waiver of juries in civil cases is the requirement for special findings.
The preparation of findings is burdensome ..... Special findings of fact, when em-
ployed, become the foundation for the judgment, and the evidence cannot be looked
to as in equity cases. It results from this that after a case has been properly established
by proof it will always be jeopardized and may frequently be ruined in the process
of transcribing it into the form of fndings.S4
The practical question presents itself, whether the burdens incident to
this practice are justified by any resulting benefits.
Special verdicts at common law were not originally employed to facili-
tate trials, but to protect juries from the additional risk of attaint which
was involved in dealing with questions of law.s5 The incidental advantage
enjoyed by the parties was due entirely to the fact that the judge, who
understood the law better than did the jury, was enabled thereby to
apply it himself to the facts, instead of attempting to qualify the jury to
apply it.
With the disappearance of the attaint the primary purpose of the
special verdict disappeared. The advantage of having the court apply the
law remained, and may have tended to increase as the law became more
complex and more difficult for juries to understand. But the burden and
jeopardy involved in preparing and using the special verdict is by no
means counter-balanced by the elimination of the risk that the jury may
not understand the law or may not or cannot properly apply it.
Be that as it may, with waiver of the jury, the whole principle employed
in the special verdict ceases to have any practical application. Having
heard the evidence and found the facts the judge can gain nothing by in-
forming himself in writing regarding what he already knows.
The specific matters in issue may perhaps be brought more effectively
to the court's attention by presenting them in the form of written find-
ings. But this can hardly be of great importance in an ordinary trial, for
the issues have already been presented, first, by the pleadings, second, by
the evidence, and third, by the arguments of counsel, so that a fourth
presentation, in the form of proposed findings, would hardly seem neces-
sary. To enjoy whatever advantage there may be, however, in this
method of focusing judicial attention on controlling issues, it is not essen-
S4 Mich. Ct. Rules, rule 37 n., § 1 (Mich. L. School ed. 1931).
ss Co. Litt., § 368 (ist Am. fr. 19th London ed. 1853); Sunderland, Verdicts, General and
Special, 29 Yale L. J. 253 (1920); Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts, 32 Yale L. J.
575 (1923).
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tial to treat a proposal for special findings as the submission of a self-
sufficient special verdict. The presentation of one or more questions of
fact, to be specifically passed upon by the court, might be authorized as
a mere matter of trial convenience, to be availed of in the court's discre-
tion. Such a rule would give the party all the protection needed against
judicial oversight, without subjecting the judgment to unnecessary risk.
Such appears to be the practice in Massachusetts. In Davis v. Boston
Elevated Ry. Co., the court said:
The judge was under no obligation to make any findings of fact. He could not be
required to do so by requests presented by the parties or either of them ..... Even in
equity, where the practice in this particular is much more liberal than at law, it has
been said that such a practice should not be encouraged, for its inevitable result would
be to put on trial the magistrate instead of the case ..... This is an action at law.
The only obligation of a judge in an action at law is to pass upon pertinent requests
for rulings of law seasonably presented and to decide the case ..... Findings of fact
not infrequently are made and the reasons of a decision stated for the information of
parties and counsel, but that is merely a practice of convenence.
v. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AS A BASIS FOR REVIEW
While the amount of, procedural litigation arising out of the operation
of the statutes relating to findings of fact and of law has been very large,
the courts have had surprisingly little to say regarding their purpose.
Apparently judges have been none too clear in their minds as to what
useful service was performed by the system of findings. Interpretation
of procedural rules would seem to require constant reference to the objects
to be attained, but such references have been conspicuously absent in
connection with these provisions.
judge Hand, in an early New York case already cited,s5 could offer no
better explanation than that the findings were useful to enable parties to
protect their rights in case of future suits. The Supreme Court of Wis-
consin suggested that their purpose was to aid the parties by showing
what was really adjudicated,-" and the Supreme Court of Washington
thought they were designed to protect the trial judge by enabling him
to place upon the record his view of the facts and the law in clear and
unmistakable form.5 9 Such explanations are inadequate.
On the other hand, there have been suggestions that findings were in-
tended to facilitate review, by offering to parties a means of bringing up
56 235 Mass. 482, 494, 126 N.E. 841, 842-43 (1920).
57 Gilchrist v. Stevenson, 7 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 273 (1852).
s Dietz v. City of Neenah, 9i Wis. 422, 64 N.W. 299, 65 N.W. 500 (1895).
s9 Bard v. Keeb, i Wash. 370, 375 (I8go).
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the case without the trouble and expense of a bill of exceptions, 6° and by
helping the reviewing court to understand the theory and the conclusions
of the trial judge. 6' During the short period when findings were provided
for in Mississippi, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court of that state
in Bloom v. Helm that "the statute requires findings only when requested
by one of the parties 'with a view to except to the decision of the court,' "
and that its object was "to enable the appellate court to see what view
was taken of the law, and what of the facts."
'62
The first of these suggestions, as to the purpose of findings in a system
of appellate review, relates to a comparatively unimportant matter, for
a meritorious appeal is rarely based upon the sole question whether find-
ings, properly and adequately embodying the proof, are sufficient in law
to support the judgment. Appeals based on the findings alone as a part
of the judgment roll are more likely to be vexatious appeals raising ques-
tions as to the technical sufficiency of the findings.
But the second suggestion, that findings facilitate the work of the re-
viewing court in an ordinary appeal, by clarifying the issues, has sub-
stantial merit.
It seems probably that this was the purpose for which findings were
first required in New York. The code of 1849 contained no provision for
findings under any circumstances. A "decision" was merely to be "given
in writing by the court, and filed with the clerk within twenty days after
the court at which the trial took place." 63 By the next section it was
provided that exception could be taken to the decision and
either party desiring a review upon the evidence appearing on the trial, either of the
questions of fact or of law, may at any time within ten days after notice of the judg-
ment ..... [make a case containing so much of the evidence as may be material to
the question to be raised. The case shall be settled according to the existing prac-
tice.]64
This section was amended in 1852 by substituting for the portion in-
closed in brackets the following:
Or within such time as may be prescribed by the rules of the court, make a case or
exceptions in like manner as upon a trial by jury, except that the judge in settling the
case must briefly specify the facts found by him, and his coiwlusions of law.6s
As so drawn the statute provided a simple and direct method of em-
ploying findings for the purpose of review without injecting them, as a
"oWestern Dry Goods Co. v. Hamilton, 86 Wash. 478, i5o Pac. 1 71 (1915).
6" Bard v. Keeb, i Wash. 370, 375 (i8go); Dietz v. City of Neenah, 91 Wis. 422, 64 N.W.
299,65 N.W. 500 (,895).
6 53 Miss. 21 (1876). 63 Sec. 267. 64 Sec. 268. 65 Italics added.
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complicating factor, into the proceedings for obtaining a judgment in the
trial court. No findings were required in any case unless and until an
appeal was taken, and they were then made and settled by the judge for
the sole purpose of facilitating the review.
Unfortunately the power of the common law tradition was too great
to permit this admirable plan to become firmly established in the pro-
cedure of New York. The alluring resemblance between special findings
and the common law special verdict seems to have irresistibly forced the
findings into the record of the trial court. In i86o section 267 of the code
was amended so as to require the decision in every case to contain "a
statement of the facts found, and the conclusions of law separately."
That apparently set the pattern for American legislation.
One group of states has a form of statute which suggests that special
findings are to be employed only for the purpose of review. The provision
is that "it shall not be necessary for the court to state its finding except,
generally, for the plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties requests
it, with a view to excepting to the decision of the court, upon the questions of
law involved in the trial, in which case the court shall state in writing the
facts found separately from the conclusions of law." Indiana, Kentucky,
Mississippi under the Code of 187,66 Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Okla-
homa, and Wyoming have substantially this provision.
It would seem from the language employed in this form of statute that
general findings, express or implied, were to be deemed sufficient for the
trial court record, as a foundation for the judgment, but that in case of
reviewt since exceptions to general findings would give little indication of
the precise points to be urged on appeal, such exceptions should be made
more definite and certain by setting forth in the appellate record the
special facts and conclusions upon which the general finding was based.
And if this were the proper interpretation it would follow that judgment
might properly be entered on the general finding and that afterward
special findings might be drawn up in preparing the case for appeal.
This view is precluded in Indiana by the addition, at the end of the
provision above quoted, of the following clause-"and judgment shall be
entered accordingly." But it is not thus precluded in the other states of
this group, because none of the others have this clause, and yet only one
of those courts seems ever to have held that the special findings could
be deferred until it appeared that they were necessary for an appeal.
In The Albin Co. v. Ellinger & Co. the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
held that it was not necessary to make special findings before judgment,
6 Sec. 65o.
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but they could properly be made at the request of the losing party as a
basis for a motion for a new trial or appeal after he knew, from the fact
that judgment was rendered against him, that he would need them for
that purpose. The court, after quoting the code provision, said:
It seems to us unreasonable to require a party to make such request before he had
any evidence or reason to believe that he would desire to except to the decision of the
court. The presumption is that each party would be expecting a favorable decision,
and the reasonable inference from such a request would be that he was at least appre-
hensive of an adverse decision, else he would not be preparing in advance to except.
It seems clear to us that the clear interpretation or meaning of the code, supra, is that
a party need not ask for such separation until after the judgment is rendered, for until
then he could not know, and should not be required to anticipate an adverse decision,
or one to which he might desire to except.67
The doctrine here announced accords exactly with the procedure relat-
ing to findings introduced in New York in 1852. In effect it transfers the
use of findings from the field of trial practice to the field of appellate re-
view. By so doing, it eliminates, in the trial court, all the useless burdens
resulting from the substitution of special findings for the common law
special verdict, and it preserves, in the appellate court, whatever advan-
tages result from a judicial specification of the precise matters of law and
fact which are challenged on appeal. 68
67 1o3 Ky. 240, 250, 44 S.W. 655, 657 (1898).
68 See comments on the use of findings by Judge W. Calvin Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 533 (Aug. 1936).
